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Introduction. 
A "zero-infinity dilemma", where there is presumed to be a
very low ("nearly zero") probability of a very high ("nearly infinite") cost, 
is the least tractible yet most important type of risk problem associated 
with evalui!ting prospective energy alternatives. The term has often been 
used to describe the nature of the risk associated with nuclear power and 
many of the best known examples have been drawn from this field, but this 
type of risk problem is associated with the other main energy alternatives 
as well. In the ·incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, for just one example, 
large scale release of aromatic hydrocarbons poses another zero-infinity 
dilemma, with the risk of cancer and mutation. 
The obvious difficulty in dealing with zero-infinity dilemmas 
is that there is little or no direct historical record to develop probability 
estimates based upon frequency. By way of illustration, in its summary the 
,Rasmussen report predicts that there is a one in five billion chance, per 
reactor year, of a catastrophic core meltdown. But the direct historical 
record of so many hundred reactor years with no meltdown is not greatly 
reassuring. This negative information, however welcome, is compatible with 
a one in a thousand chance of catastrophic meltdown as well as the one-in-
fi ve-bi l lion Rasmussen estimate. The actuarial record, taken in simple terms 
of meltdowns per reactor year, is far too short to discriminate between the 
two. Nor do we want to wait for a long record of history of reactor years
in order to develop an estimate of the probability of meltdown. On the 
contrary, we need the estimate of probabi·lity before a large scale program is 
undertaken, in order to decide upon the safety features and the scale of the 
program. 
- 2 -
Decision Trees and Accountability 
In spite of this somewhat pessimistic introduction, I believe 
that an actuarial approach, broadly concei.ved, has sornethi ng constructive to 
say about the more accurate quantification of risk even in the toughest case 
of the zero-infinity dilemma. We may begin with a comment by William Stephen­
son, director of British Intelligence in World War II: "I can speak only of 
industrial 'accidents'. If you have access to insurance company files, you 
will see detailed studies of the weak point in any manufacturing process or 
mining procedure. Insurance companies stand to lose fortunes from an accident, 
and so they employ experts to figure out every possible way that things can 
go wrong. Their reports are guidebooks for saboteurs. 111
Two principal observations follow from this comment. First, the 
comment suggests that decades ago insurance companies were using, at least 
informally, an approach of error analysis which later flowered in the enormous 
complexity of the Rasmussen report and similar treatments of decision trees. 
From this observation it may seem curious that as the procedures of risk 
assessment have become greatly more sophisticated, the public' s level of 
confidence in the risk assessments, especially those related to nuclear power, 
appears to have declined. This phenomenon has led some practitioners of risk 
assessment to suggest that perhaps the public is irrational, not understanding 
the techniques of risk assessment, in particular in dealing with low probabili­
ties. But, if this perceived phenomenon is a real one, and public skepticism 
has actually increased, the second observation suggests that this skepticism 
may in fact be rationally based once the nature of the incentive structure is 
taken into account. 
In dealing with incentives relating to insurance, economists 
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have focused upon the behavior of the insured party and the problem of "moral 
hazard". As a second observation Stephenson reminds us that we should also 
consider the .incentive structure upon the risk assessors themselves. In the 
normal practice of insurance ( which does not deal with societal zero-infinity
dilemmas) an insurance company can find out relatively quickly how accurately
it has assessed the probabilities of various accidents; moreover, it stands to 
lose greatly if its assessments are inaccurate. The situation is different 
when there are zero-infinity dilemmas. 
Most zero-infinity dilemmas appear to share a number of other 
characteristics besides the presumed low probability and the potentially 
catastrophic outcome.2 In our discussion here the most important other
characteristic is latency. For the greenhouse effect associated with fossil 
energy sources, it takes many years for co2 to build up and the projected
climate changes to occur and decades to know whether or not there would be 
catastrophic effects following from our present decisions about fossil fuel. 
There are similarly long latency periods between the initiation of action and 
the manifestation of result from chemical carcinogens or radiation. Even such 
a dramatic event as a core meltdown is associated with a long latency in terms 
of the expected waiting time for its first occurrence. Latency means that 
there are few, if any, direct tests of the risk assessor' s accuracy. Lack 
of a direct test means a lack of accountability, unless of course indirect 
tests can be devised. 
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and costs but with special force to risks of the zero-infinity character 
because of the greater latency before actual knowledge of costs and risks. 
Certain alternatives, for example microwave transmission from satellite 
collection of solar energy, appear to be in this first stage. I am not 
suggesting here that the current assessments of risk and cost are in fact 
underassessments, but that at early stages of a new industry there are incen­
tives, stemming from latencies of adverse effects, for such underassessment. 
After a few decades, if several of the more optimistic predic­
tions have proved false, a generalized skepticism is likely to set in, 
articulated in large part as observations about incentives upon the risk and 
cost assessors. It appears that the nuclear industry has moved into this 
second stage. One often hears such statements as "I have. little faith in 
so-and-so's estimate, he consults for the industry", or "Of course he assesses 
the risks very low, he is a nuclear engineer and his career is at stake". 
While such ad hominem interpretations are no doubt galling to the risk assessors 
involved, protestations of obj.ectivity have little impact at this stage. In 
the second stage the principal concern is establishing, or reestablishing, 
the credibility of the risk and cost assessors. Again I wish to emphasize 
that there is no necessary connection between an incentive and an outcome. 
But the public is right to pay attention to incentives. 
Careful attention to institutional design and the role of 
incentives in it is beneficial for the following reasons: increasing the 
L atency, by no means only to be associated with the zero-infinity accountability of the risk assessors, by developing more explicit direct and
dilemmas, explains a common pattern of new industries. In the first stage, it 
is to the advantage of the industry development to understate the risks and 
other costs associated with it. This incentive applies to all types of risks 
indirect tests of their predictions, is the most constructive way of increasing 
public confidence in the entire assessment process; at the same time better 
assessments of risk may be obtained. Separating safety regulation from develop­
ment in the AEC is an example of attention to incentives. 
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Keeping Score 
In sporting events score is kept at two levels. At one level 
keeping score is a measure of the individual's or team's effort or success 
of effort, for example the number of goals scored in the first ten minutes 
of a basketball game. On the second level score is kept of the wins and losses 
of an individual in competition with others. Even where there is no formalized 
competition, score as a measure of effort is kept, for example in solo golf 
or in first ascents in mountain climbing, and this measure of effort is a 
requisite for scoring wins and losses in a formal, competitive setting. Still 
it is the scoring of the wins and losses that counts in most sports. 
In the field of risk assessment, we are familiar with keeping 
score as a measure of the assessor' s efforts, but less familiar with scoring 
the wins and losses of one assessor in direct competition with another. And 
indeed many may consider this an undesirable direction to go in, believing 
that the "game" of risk assessment is already too adversarial, especially in 
the area of nuclear energy. However, it is worth noting that the actuarial 
approach, in the setting of insurance industries, is directly competitive. 
One compan y competes against another, and the market keeps score of wins and 
losses. 
In the area of energy, risk assessment, especially for zero­
infinity dilemmas, is mainly a government sponsored activity. But even if 
governments wished to establish competitive tests of performance, in some 
sense analogous to market tests, the task is made difficult by latency and 
the infrequency of observation of rare events. There are occasions, however, 
where latency is not a problem or where indirect tests could be constructed. 
It is interesting to speculate upon how a formalized competitive approach 
might go. 
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Consider the partly hypothetical example of the SNAP reactor, 
which was developed as a power plant for space vehicles. Before the satellite 
was launched the AEC predicted a very low probability of failure. An assess­
ment of a lo-8 probability of failure appeared, although this was probably an 
informal and not official estimate. During the same period skeptics assessed 
the risk of failure to be much higher. While I doubt that a numerical estimate 
was produced that reflected the consensus view of the skeptics, or official 
estimate of a known organization of skeptics, such as the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, for the sake of illustration we may attribute an assessment 
of 10-4 probability of failure to NRDC.
We can imagine that a game is being played, with the immediate 
object of increasing one's credibility. We begin the game with an initial 
distribution of credibility among the players. On the basis of the relative 
sizes of the organizations and the numbers of experts in each, suppose we 
assign an initial credibility measure of .9g to the AEC and 0.01 to NRDC.
The players gain or lose credibility depending on their risk assessments and 
the outcome of the experiment, in this case the launching of the satellite. 
We define two states: 
eAEC The AEC is accurate in its risk assessment
eNRDC NRDC is accurate in its risk assessment;
the two risk assessments for the SNAP reactor failure: 
P(FleAEC) = 10-
8
P ( F l eNRDC ) = 10-4. 
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When there are many experiments, or rounds, we can write 
Pt(FleAEC) AEC assessment of probability of failure in round t;
Pt(FleNRDC} NRDC assessment of probability of failure in round t;
Pt(SleAEC) AEC assessment of probability of success in round .t;
Pt(SleNRDC} NRDC assessment of probability of success in round t.
We start with the two initial measures of credibility 
C(O, AEC} = 0.99; 
C(O, NRDC} = 0.01; 
these initial values correspond to poll positions in a horse race. 
We can define the credibility measures in round t by a formula 
corresponding to Bayes' Theorem: 
(2) 
and 
If round t turns out to be a failure 
C(t,AEC) 
Pt(FieAEC) C(t -1, AEC}
t . t . p (FleAEC}C(t -1, AEC} + p (FleNRDC}C(t -1, NRDC}
And if round t turns out to be a success 
C(t,AEC) 
t P (SieAEC}C(t -1, AEC}
t t ' p (SleAEC}C(t -1, AEC} + p (SleNRDC}C(t - 1 , NRDC} 
C( t, NRDC} 1- C ( t, AEC} 
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In the second round we would start with credibility 
measures (C(l,AEC},C(l,NRDC}}, and the contested risk assessments for 
some other event, which could be a second try for the SNAP reactor or a 
quite different event whose rarity is at issue between the AEC and NRDC, 
but which can be observed and scored. Then we would compute the second 
round credibilities from (1) with t=2. The initial credibility measure
(C(O,AEC},C(O,NRDC} is the same as the prior distribution in decision 
analysis; and the first round credibility measure (C(l,AEC},C(l,NRDC}) 
is the same as the posterior distribution. It would not be worth recasting 
the notation from that in standard decision theory, except for the slight 
extension from the usual interpretation -- it is assumed that eAEC refers
to an entire technique and capacity for risk analysis, and thus the 
credibility measure describing the AEC assessment of a SNAP failure also 
describes AEC assessments of other risks.3
In the case of the SNAP reactor, the experiment was undertaken 
and unfortunately the reactor failed upon its first try. Direct computation 
from Bayes' Theorem shows that the credibility measure for the AEC falls from 
0.99 to 0.01 and the measure for NRDC rises correspondingly. Such an enormous 
fall in credibility is startling and it raises a number of interesting issues. 
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First of all it illustrates that the initial seeding of players, which is done 
on the basis of outside judgment, can be quickly overcome by an actual track 
record. On the contrary we might ask should a credibility measure be defined 
to be capable of such volatility? This is really a question of the applicability 
of standard decision theory to low probability events, as it has nothing to 
do with our assumption of extension, whic� says that the credibility measure applies 
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estimates of risk or other numbers depending on what he thinks the other 
player is going to do? In other words, are there dominant strategies and 
if so, do they produce unbiased estimates of risk? 
If credibility games could be developed with sincere dominant 
strategies, they could provide powerful incentives toward more accurate risk 
assessment. The incentive would apply to both players, so that one would 
expect a convergence of risk assessments, a welcome phenomenon. An important 
to the entire risk assessment capacity not just one prediction, and allows • purpose of establishing a formal game of the sort sketched above is to provide 
us to go from one round to the. next. This question has to do with the 
relative weights to be given to the prior and the new evidence, which is a 
basic question in decision analysis. 
Without deeper discussion of this last question, we may note 
that the volatility is asymmetric. If the SNAP reactor had succeeded NRDC' s 
credibility measure would have fallen, but its percentage change would have 
been much smaller. At least it can be said that the asymmetry is in the right 
direction. When both parties agree that a failure is rare, there is more 
information in a failure than in a success ( as to the accuracy of the risk
assessments) .
If we look at this credibility "game" as a sequential process 
lasting hundreds or thousands of rounds, where not a 11 the probability assess­
ments have to be on rare events, we may ask questions of convergence. Suppose 
that the AEC were indeed more accurate in its risk assessment than NRDC. How 
long would it take to show up in its credibility measure? For a long sequence 
of rounds, how much does the initial posting or seeding of players matter? 
Given that the object of the game is to maximize one's own credibility over
a sequence of rounds, is a player better off publishing his own "sincere" 
for near term accountability for both players, for assessments and statements 
about their assessments. At the present time it is unclear to the out-
sider how seriously to take the failure of the SNAP reactor, for example. 
It is possible that the AEC has made hundreds of thousands of predictions and 
NRDC has seized upon the unlucky one. On the other hand it is possible that 
the AEC got away with overly optimistic predictions by not making them formal 
and then keeping quiet about the failures. Without keeping score on the wins 
and losses there is no way to tell. 
Even though at present there is no accountability of the risk 
assessors along the lines of the formal game outlined above, to some extent 
this game informally exists already ( and in a marred form) . Agencies lose
credibility when they assign very low probabilities to events which then happen, 
especially when critics have assigned larger probabilities. Agencies gain 
credibility in the reverse situation. Thus it would be useful to analyze the 
winning strategies in such games to see what incentives are on the players, 
even in the informal situation. 
As mentioned earlier, even without establishing a formal competi­
tion and scoring the wins and losses of the players in comparison with each 
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other, it is possible to keep score on the individual level, of the solo 
player. When we are dealing with final events, such as the success or failure 
of a reactor, with very low assessed probabilities of failure, just one or 
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O or 1, depending on whether the benign or adverse hypothesis about the state
of nature turns out to be true. It is not possible to tell whether or not a 
single assessment of the likelihood of a particular hypothesis is realistic 
two failures casts doubt upon the assessment process, unless there are hundreds or not. However, with the assumption of extension ( that an agency's assessment
of millions of low probability assessments being made. 
A comparison can be made with the problem of assessing the · 
p·robability of a perfect bridge hand ( where one player gets all clubs, another
all hearts, etc. ) . Textbook exercises, based upon combinatorial principles,
yield an extremely low estimate of probability. The estimate is so low that 
a single occurrence of a perfect hand casts doubt on the probability estimate. 
And as perfect hands .are reported every few years, the assessment techniq1:1e 
itself has been reconsidered. Upon review it appears that some perfect hands 
are the result of gags ( which would correspond to Stephenson' s sabotage) .
Moreover, it appears that when sabotage is prevented, as in tournaments, the 
probability of a perfect hand is still too high to be explained by a combina­
torial calculation. It appears much more likely that perfect hands result 
from a "common mode failure" -- that is, the probabilities of one intermediate 
event are conditional upon another intermediate event. New decks come in 
perfect hands and shuffling is not entirely random, so that dealing is not 
made up of independent events. Thus even the single occurrence of a presumed 
very rare event can lead to the reassessment of the risk assessment technique 
and the adoption of more realistic techniques. 
The evaluation of risk assessment is made more difficult by 
the fact that many of the gambles being assessed are not repeatable experiments. 
They are assessments of gambles about the state of nature, which may be one 
way or another. Each gamble is assessed at its own probability, typically a 
very low one for the kinds of problems we are considering, and then scored 
technique is consistently accurate or inaccurate) it is still possible to score
an overall effort. 
Suppose that an agency were totally accurate in its risk assess­
l)lElnts and its estimate of the risk of failure ( or adverse hypothesis) of the
ith gamble is pi. Then the sum of N such Bernoulli random variables has
expectation 
and variance 
N 
i�l pi
l p. (1- p. )1 1 
This binominal-like random variable ( the pi are different) allows us to score
the aggregate effort of the risk assessor and ask how likely it is that the 
assessor has been accurate. 
Because of latency, there is limited opportunity to develop this 
type of scorecard for a solo player, if we insist upon evaluating probability 
estimates of final events, such as core meltdowns. However, this technique 
applies to the scoring of intermediate events and partial chains upon fault 
trees. In fact it may apply more suitably to the evaluation of probability 
assessments of intermediate events than final events. Not only are there 
more intermediate events to evaluate, often with less of a latency problem, 
but also evaluation of intermediate events lends itself to testing assumptions 
of independence. Common mode failures take place in the intermediate chains 
of events more directly than across final events. As the binominal-like dis­
tribution assumes independence of the underlying Bernoulli random variables, 
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this assumption is tested simultaneously with the assumption of accuracy of 
the individual assessment of the pi.
4
The binominal-like distribution provides a way of testing the 
aggregative performance of the risk assessor. Depending on the types of 
assessments being evaluated it can also test as well the assessor's allowance 
for, or treatment of, the possibilities of human error (e.g. the initiation 
of the Brown's Ferry accident) or his own tunnel vision (leaving out paths or 
focusing on the wrong ones). 
Con cl us ion 
Interpreted narrowly as the method of calculating probabilities 
of final events by their historical frequency, the actuarial approach has 
limited application for risk analysis in the energy area, especially where 
there are low probabilities of catastrophes, and often latencies. Interpreted 
broadly as the approach to risk estimation found in insurance markets, the 
actuarial approach has much to offer. The actuarial approach, in the context 
of market competition, uses the historical record to reward the companies 
with accurate risk assessors and starve the others. The actuarial approach 
directs us to increase the accountability of the risk assessors in government 
sponsored assessments and keep score of the success of effort of the individual 
risk assessors. The approach suggests an analysis of the incentive structure 
on the assessors themselves, and of the strategies of the (informal) games the 
assessors are placed into. The goals of the actuarial approach, broadly 
conceived, are (l) to achieve better point estimates of probabilities, (2) to
achieve a better understanding of the credibility or subjective confidence 
interval to be associated with the point estimates, (3) to understand better 
the incentives for under- or overassessment, and (4) to increase the level of 
confidence of the public in the entire assessment process, through explicit 
evaluation of performance. 
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